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NATIONAL WELFARE AND LOCAL PRODUCTION BY
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the national welfare generated by five
different modes of local production and how host governments
regulate multinational enterprises' production activities in host
countries. It has shown that the interest of the host government
conflicts with that of an MNE. It is suggested that, in order to
increase national welfare, the host government may encourage
multiple licensing, and may set different royalty rate ceilings
and periods of licensing for different industries.

The presence of multinational enterprises (MNEs) poses a dilemma to host govern-
ments [Caves 1982; Hymer 1970]. One the one hand, MNEs generate efficient allocations
of resources and bring know-how and capital to host countries. On the other hand, host
governments would like to reduce MNEs' excessive market power and gain a fair share of
the benefits generated by their local operations. This dilemma leads to the need for appro-
priate commercial policies toward MNEs. A major concern is whether host governments
should regulate entry by MNEs and, if so, in what manner. Research on the investment
behavior of MNEs largely focuses on capital flow and trade pattern which result from
policy instruments (e.g. taxes and tariffs) employed by host governments [e.g., Batra and
Ramachandran 1980]. Not enough attention has been paid to the welfare implications of
the modes of local production employed by MNEs. 1 MNEs can employ several modes to
produce in a host country. For example, the MNE can fully own a local entity, share the
ownership with local partners, or license its technology to local licensees. The welfare to
host countries is different for each mode. This paper assesses the welfare generated by
different modes of local production and discusses the actions host governments can take
to increase gains from MNEs' operations.
In practice, host governments adopt a variety of actions to ensure that their economies
benefit from MNEs' operations. These actions, including limitations on foreign ownership,
royalty rates, and fixed terms for licensing agreements, force MNEs to reduce their payoffs
from operating in the local economies if they decide to produce in host countries. This
paper provides the theoretical underpinnings of these practices. We will show that the
optimal mode of local production for MNEs is not the optimal one for host governments,
and thus, it is justifiable for host governments to regulate MNEs' entry. This paper will
also discuss counter strategies used by MNEs in responding to regulations imposed by host
governments.
We will examine five modes which an MNE can adopt to produce in a host coun-
try: foreign direct investment (FDI), where an MNE fully owns a local entity; exclusive
licensing (EL), where an MNE licenses its technology to one local entity; multiple licensing
(ML), where an MNE licenses its technology to several local entities; joint venture (JV),
where an MNE shares the ownership of a local entity with a partner; and a combination
of joint venture and licensing (JVL), where an MNE shares the ownership of a local en-
tity with a local partner and signs a licensing agreement with the local entity. We will
derive the national welfare for each mode and demonstrate the preference of modes from
the host government's perspective. To highlight the conflict between the MNE and the
host government, the profit of each mode to the MNE is derived and compared with the
preference of the host government. Unlike Bardhan[l982], this study provides analyses in
Exceptions are Bardhan [1982] and Horstmann and Markusen [1987],
a dynamic context, covers more complicated entry modes, and considers MNEs' reactions
to host government regulations.
The remainder of the paper is divided into three sections. Section I presents the model.
Policy implications are discussed in section II. The third section provides the conclusions.
I. The Model
The host government is concerned with the long term pay-off it will receive from
foreign firms' operations. We assume taxes away and define national welfare as total
surplus: the sum of consumer surplus and local producer surplus. The present value of
national welfare is
W = I \CS{t) +PS{t)]c- rt dt
Jo
where r is the discount rate, W is the discounted national welfare, and CS{i) and PS{t)
stand for consumer surplus and producer surplus at time t respectively.
The above equation addresses a major difference between two kinds of entry modes:
FDI, JV, and JVL on the one hand, and EL and ML on the other hand. When an MNE
owns a local entity either completely (FDI) or holds no less than 50% of the equity as in the
cases of JV and JVL, it will maintain effective control over the know-how and will receive
pay-offs from the local entity for an unlimited period of time. On the other hand, when
an MNE licenses its know-how in the host country, it is possible that local licensee(s) will
be able to acquire the know-how and become independent after the licensing agreement (s)
expires. Consequently, no pay-offs will be paid to the MNE from the local entity and
national welfare will increase when the licensing agreement(s) is(are) no longer effective.
For simplicity and without losing generality, this paper assumes that licensing expiration
coincides with know-how independency.
The next step is to specify CS(t) and PS(t) under different modes of local production.
We first construct a general model with varying equity holding and licensing fees. This
model covers FDI, JV, EL, and JVL, and will be applied to the periods before and after
licensing expiration. Then the case of multiple licensing is analyzed. Given the profit
maximizing behavior of both the MNE and the local entity, the host government formulates
its regulations.
We assume that the MNE in our analysis is a monopolist2 (e.g. a pharmaceutical
company with a patented drug) which faces a constant-elasticity demand function in the
2 Our analyses also apply to the situation where an MNE becomes a monopolist after
entering the host country.
host country as follows:
Q = P-«,T1> 1
where Q is the output, P is the price and 77 is the price elasticity of demand. We also
assume that the production function exhibits a constant return to scale. Let c be the
constant production cost and / be the unit royalty rate,3 then the unit production cost
of the local entity in the host country becomes c + /. Let a(0 < a < 1) be the equity
held by the MNE and V be the profit of the local venture. Because local producer surplus
is the local investors' share of the profit of the local entity, the local producer surplus is
(1 — a)V . Without host government restrictions, the MNE controls price, output level, a,
and /. But for EL, the MNE controls only / and the local licensee maximizes its profits
given / and the demand function.
It can be shown that, as long as the licensing agreement is effective and the MNE
owns a of the local entity, the instantaneous national welfare is
(1) w = (
c ±
/)'"
((1 _ eftlZiy, + (-?-)'-)77-1 rj rj - 1
For notation simplification, we define u; =
-37 (-^if^)
1-
"- For FDI, a = 1 and / = 0,
thus national welfare is WFDI = f™ u>e~ rt dt. Assuming that the MNE's equity holding
is 50%, which is the maximum permissible foreign ownership in many countries [United
Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations 1983], national welfare of JV is equal to
WJV = f™ cj( 3 '^~ 1 )e~ rt dt. National welfare is more complicated in the cases of JVL and
EL. In the JVL case, even though the host government can restrict foreign ownership,
national welfare will depend on the trade-off between equity holding and licensing fees
made by the MNE. In the EL case, the host government needs to consider the impact on
welfare after the licensing agreement expires.
In the JVL case, the MNE receives pay-offs from equity ownership as well as from
the licensing agreement. The MNE chooses / and a to maximize its profit. In order to
evaluate the effects of regulations, it is necessary to understand how the regulations on /
and a affect the profit of the MNE and the MNE's likely responses. Let n represent the
present value of the MNE's profit, then
r 00 1
(2) tt= / (a*V + f*Q)e- rt dt= ±[a(c + /) 1 -'rT''(r? - l)^" 1 * +/* (-^-(c +
Jo r 17-1
/))'
3
If we allow a two-part tariff for licensing fees, the case will be trivial. Given that many
host governments restrict licensing fees, we assume this trivial case does not exist. One
could also argue that an MNE does not explicitly have to charge a licensing fee in this case
because it can build the licensing fee into the price of semi-finished products sold to the
venture. To achieve this goal, there have to be some tie-in agreements between the MNE
and the venture. However, host governments usually restrict this practice [UNIDO 1978].
Since n is an increasing function of a, regardless of /, the MNE will try to hold as much
equity of the local entity as it can. Therefore, in the absence of host government regulations,
the MNE will adopt FDI. 4 If the host government sets a limitation on the equity share
held by foreign firms, the MNE needs to decide on the optimal /. On the one hand, a high
/ will increase licensing income to the limit that the demand function allows. On the other
hand, a high / will reduce the local venture's profit and thus decrease the equity income
of the MNE. The optimal / can be obtained from the first order condition of equation (2),
which is
(3) / =
C(1
"
a)
ri + a-l
Equation (3) reveals the trade-off between a and / for the MNE. Substituting (3) into (l),
assuming that a = 0.5, the national welfare of JVL is WJVL = /o°° <*> ^j-1 ( ^-j-
)
l " " e~
rt
dt.
In the case of EL in which the MNE licenses its know-how exclusively to a local firm
(i.e., a = 0), the optimal unit royalty rate is / = -~. As discussed before, national
welfare will change after the expiration of the licensing agreement. Let T be the number of
years the licensing agreement is effective and assume that after T years, the local licensee
acquires the know-how. Consequently, the MNE will not receive any royalty payments from
the local entity. Hence after T, the exclusive licensee becomes a monopolist and national
welfare for each period under EL is u;(l 4- 2-z^-). Therefore, the discounted national welfare
of EL, WEL , is /o
r W(^)-^e-(if + /" W (l + *±)e-«dt.
The MNE can also license its technology to a number of local firms. It has to decide
how many firms it wants to license to and the unit royalty rate it wants to charge. We
assume that after multiple licensing, the market reaches a Cournot equilibrium. If the
MNE licenses to n local firms, the profit of the MNE is irML = /Q
T
e
l
~"rj~ n (rj - l) n ~ l (1 -
^-) n e~ rt dt. Because this profit is an increasing function of n, the MNE will try to license
to as many licensees as possible.6 As n —> oo, the national welfare is u. After T years, as the
4 MNEs' preference of FDI over other entry modes seems to be consistent with the findings
of other studies. Davidson and McFetridge [1985] found that firms prefer FDI to EL when
there are no government restrictions on their entry. Stopford and Wells [1972] also found
that firms usually prefer FDI to licensing or to other strategies to serve foreign markets.
Teece [1981, 1986] has suggested that FDI has a lower transaction cost than EL for the
transfer of complex technologies abroad and thus is preferred by MNEs.
5 The national welfare is also an increasing function of n. Since the interest of the MNE
is consistent with that of the host government, there is no need to regulate the number of
licensees.
licensees acquire the know-how, the local market becomes competitive and the national
welfare becomes w(-^) n ~ l for each period. Thus, the discounted national welfare is
WML = /; ue-'dt I /" w^'-'e-"*.
Having derived national welfare under different modes of local production in the host
country, we will draw a number of policy implications. We will first compare the preference
of the host government to that of the MNE and then discuss how host government should
regulate the production activities of MNEs.
II. Policy Implications
Proposition 1: The preference of national welfare is characterized as follows:
[})WML >WEL
(H)WML >WFDI
and
(iii)WJV >WFDI >WJVL
Proof: The proofs of (i) and (ii) are straightforward.6 For (iii), since ™ JY = 3n
2
~
l
> 1,
WJV > WFDI . The remaining question is whether WJVL > WFDl . We use Cauchy-
Schwarz inequality to show that ™ iY U < 1.
First, the welfare ratio is ^-^ = **=-* l 2*^1 )" ' l . Let n = *-,n> m, then
(3
"
" 1] (2„)<
=
{ W )
Let a< =
3r
2
~ i
for 1 < t < m, and a, = 2^~ I for m + 1 < j < n. Since $/a x a^a3 • • • an <
f3n _ J2'?- 1)" 1 < f (3f?-l)m + (2iy-l)(n-m)1
' [2fiY ~
l
2nr?
;
r
(3^-l)m + (2^-l)(n-m)
I
2ni
'
TO
= 1
Thus, WVd/ > WJVL . Therefore,
See Bardhan [1982) for the proof that (^7)"" ^r < 1.
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From (i), (ii), and (Hi) we know that depending upon r,T, and rz, either WJV >
WML > WFD j > WJVL or WML > WJV > WFDl > WJVL . For example, assuming
r = 0.10, simulation results show that unless the licensing period is extremely long (over
twelve years), the national welfare resulting from multiple licensing is greater than that
from joint venture.
Generally speaking, the higher the discount rate, and the longer the licensing period,
the less beneficial the licensing mode (EL or ML) is to the host country. Similarly, the
higher the n, from equation 3, the lower the unit royalty rate compared to cost, and
consequently the more beneficial the mode is to the host country.
The comparison between EL and, FDI, JV and JVL is not conclusive. Taking EL
and FDI as an example, Figure 1 presents the combinations of T and rj which favor EL
(the zone under EL), and these combinations favor FDI (the zone under FDI). The line
in Figure 1 represents the indifference curve for the host government to either FDI or EL.
It shows that, for rj > 2, it is likely that exclusive licensing is preferred over FDI. 7 This
result contradicts that of Bardhan [1982]. The main difference is that Bardhan assumes
perpetual licensing, where a licensing agreement lasts forever.8 We have posited a dynamic
framework and incorporated the technological independence of host country firms into the
model.
Insert Figure 1 here
The pay-offs to the MNE under different modes of local production in the host country
is the share of its profit from the local entity and/or licensing income. The discounted
profits of FDI, JV, and JVL can be easily derived from equation (2). For example, if the
MNE adopts the JVL mode and a = 0.5, then, / = 5-^7. From equation (3), ttjvl =
f°°
c
i-n
_L_(_2_)-'»(^iL_)-n e-rt (ft ]f the MNE licenses its know-how exclusively to one
local firm, a = 0, the optimal unit royalty rate is / = -£y. Since the licensing agreement
will expire after year T,nEL =
/
Q
T
fQe~ rt dt = ^""n" 3 " (f7~ l) (2 " _ l) {l-c' rT ). Similarly,
7
If the corporate income tax rate in'the host country is higher than the royalty withholding
tax rate, FDI will be more beneficial to the host country.
8 Under perpetual licensing, it is easy to show that
Wjv >WFDI =WUL >WJVL >WEL .
the profit of multiple licensing when n — oo is ttu L = c 1 n (r)~ n ){r) - 1)" -1 (1 - e~ rr ).
Based upon the profit of different entry modes, we derive Proposition 2.
Proposition 2: In the long run, FDI yields the highest discounted profit and EL results
in the lowest discounted profit. Superiority among ML, JV, and JVL in the long run
depends on rT and rj.
(i) IfrT>
-lnfl-t^)-"), thtnicML >icJV l > *jv
(ii) jr/-ln(l-( 5|a_)-') >rT>ln2, thenicJVL >irhiL > nJV
(iii) // In 2 > rT, then "Kjvl > "j v > *u l
Proof: First, we will show that FDI is the dominant mode. Since 1 — e rT < 1, " rai =
(1 - e~
rT )- 1 > 1. Also, =^- = (1 - i )-"(l - c- rT )
_1
> 1. In addition, ^-^- = 2 and
'-e-°-L = (1 -- -M - '' > 1. Thus, FDI is the dominant mode in the long run.
n JV L * 2fj
Next, we will show that tcjvl > otjv > jtE l- The profit ratio of JVL to JV is
=-"<-* = 2(1 - £-)". Since n > 1, (1 - zM" > 7, then ^^ > 1.Wjy V 2»T ' ' ' V 2rj ' 2 ' »;v
It remains to compare the EL and JV entry modes. The profit ratio is ^-^ =
H^NJ ~ "T1)" 1 - Since (^r)" > c > 2 ' */v > Tel- Thus, 7rrx?/ > nJVL >
Tjv > ^el- The next question is the order of irUL relative to the discounted profit of
other modes.
We first compare the discounted profit of ML to that of JVL. The profit ratio is
Stt = (i^T)"(l - <
_rT
)- * *hl > *jvl, then (1 - «T'r ) > {^)'\ which is
equivalent to rT > - ln(l - (^-j-)""). Thus, if rT > - ln(l - (5^7)"" ),*>£>/ > *m £, >
If rT < — ln(l — (
a
2i )~ n )» we ne€d to compare v^l to n^v • The profit ratio is
^f = 2(1 -e" rT ). Obviously, if rT > \n2,irML > irJV . Thus, if - ln(l - (5^37)"") >
rT > ln2,7i> DI > nJVL > nML > jtjv > irEL .
Since ttm l > nEL and if rT < In 2, nF
D
t > n
j
v L > irJV > irM L > irB L .
In conclusion, FDI is the mode of local production most preferred by the MNE. The
order of preference of the rest of the modes depends on rT as compared to In 2 and
— ln(l —
( 2
2
Zi )"*) I11 any case? EL generates the smallest discounted profit.
Propositions 1 and 2 indicate the conflict of interest between the MNE and the host
government. For example, if r = 0.10 and T < 6.9, the MNE's preference is represented as
*FDI > *JVL > *JV > *ML > KeL
while the host government's preference is represented as
WML >WJV >WFDI >WJVL
The host government prefers multiple licensing and joint venture while the MNE desires
a wholly-owned subsidiary or a joint venture with a licensing agreement. Because of this
conflict of interests, there is a need for host government regulations. In fact, as shown in
equation (1), national welfare decreases with a and thus it is in the interest of the host
government to restrict foreign ownership. This conclusion justifies the common practice of
limitation of foreign ownership in host countries. Korea and India, for example, all have
local ownership requirements for foreign subsidiaries.
However, an MNE can counter the regulations of foreign ownership by adopting a JVL
mode. If the host government requires local ownership, the MNE can increase its profit by
applying equation (3), as graphed in Figure 2 for rj = 2 and 3 for a given equity holding. In
Figure 2, if the MNE is allowed to hold no more than a x equity, the MNE will respond by
charging /x unit royalty rate and thus reduce the effectiveness of the ownership regulation.
Therefore, the host government may want to set a royalty rate ceiling to ensure its share
of the pay-off from the MNE's local operations.
For example, the host government may set a royalty rate ceiling, /2 , in connection
with the local ownership requirement (1 — o^). Since the profit of the MNE is an increasing
function of a, the MNE will hold the maximum allowable equity share, a
x
and will charge
/2 as the unit royalty rate if tj = 2. However, the host government should not impose
unnecessary regulations such as the dual regulations a x and f2 when rj = 3 as shown in
Figure 2. In this case, the optimal royalty rate is /3 , which is lower than the royalty
rate ceiling. Therefore, the policy implication for the host government is that it should
set different royalty rate ceilings for industries with different demand elasticities. The
host government has another alternative to avoid the manipulation of equity holding and
royalty rates by the MNE: banning the simultaneous use of joint venture and licensing
agreements. The member countries of Andean Common Market, for example, prohibits
royalty payments from affiliates to foreign parents [Grosse 1980].
Insert Figure 2 here
The host government should also encourage multiple licensing which will eventually
create a competitive market.9 In most developing countries there are no governmental
restrictions on multiple licensing, and it is felt exclusivity as a matter of negotiation be-
tween foreign firms and local firms [UNIDO 1978]. Two special cases are Japan and India,
9 To implement this policy, for example, the host government may require foreign licensors
to license to any local firm which is interested in the technology.
9
with the former discouraging multiple licensing at one time and the latter encouraging it
currently [Contractor 1985; UNIDO 1978].
The policy of encouraging multiple licensing may be difficult to carry out. In our
model, national welfare will increase when the number of local licensee is large. This
indicates two potential problems: the existence of a large number of potential buyers of
foreign technology and no abnormal profits for licensees when many of them sign licensing
agreements with a foreign firm. If multiple licensing is not feasible in the host country,
the host government should encourage exclusive licensing if the period of licensing is short
and encourage joint venture if the period of licensing is long. Since the complexity of tech-
nology affects the period of licensing, the implication is that for less complex technologies
which can be mastered by local firms within a short period of time, the government should
strengthen the bargaining position of local firms and enhance national welfare by limiting
the period of licensing and prohibiting FDI and JVL. However, when complex technolo-
gies are involved, host governments should encourage joint ventures and should not set
unrealistic restrictions on the period of licensing. Some host governments do carry out
this policy. For example, Korea normally limits the period of licensing to five years, but
the term can be extended if an advanced technology is involved [UNIDO 1978]. Because
royalty rate ceilings depend on demand elasticities and because restrictions on the period
of licensing depend on the complexity of technology, it is understandable that some host
governments review licensing agreements between foreign and local firms on a case by case
basis.
In summary, the above discussion provides a theoretical rationale for host governments
to set restrictions on MNEs' mode of local production. The combination of different forms
of restrictions, such as foreign ownership, royalty rates, and period of licensing agreement,
can increase national welfare.
III. Conclusions
This paper examines the national welfare generated by five different modes of local
production and how host governments regulate MNEs' production activities in host coun-
tries. It has shown that the interest of the host government conflicts with that of an MNE.
Consequently, interventions in the entry of MNEs are legitimate. It is suggested that, in
order to increase national welfare, the host government may encourage multiple licensing,
and may set different royalty rate ceilings and periods of licensing for different industries.
Our analyses can be extended to study whether host governments should ban MNEs'
entry completely when they face an existing but inefficient local producer. 10 The main
reason for banning foreign entry is that although the efficient foreign producer can increase
10 For example, if the entry of MNE results in the replacement of the existing inefficient
10
consumer surplus, it may not offset the loss of local producer surplus incurred by the
inefficient local monopolist. The above model can also be expanded to study the extent of
foreign ownership restrictions in exchange for exporting.
While regulations on MNEs set by host governments can increase national welfare,
they may be countered by retaliations from other countries. The policy implications pro-
posed above seem to be more applicable to less developed countries where retaliations do
not cause great damage. Finally, pitfalls regarding total surplus analysis certainly apply
to our findings.
producer, it can be shown that if c' < (^tt)^1"^ where c' is the local unit production
cost, the host government should ban foreign entry through JV. If c' < (^ty)" - ' c > tne
host government should ban foreign entry through FDI.
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